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CONSTITUTION-TALK AND JUSTICE-TALK
Mark Tushnet*
Does anything distinguish constitution-talk from justice-talk?
Professors Eisgruber and Sager have written extensively about what
they call the justice-seeking Constitutionl-a document that takes
establishing justice as a goal for legislation and as a guide to the
document's own interpretation. Their position makes the
Constitution and justice coincident, so that an inquiry into the
Constitution's meaning is simultaneously, and indistinguishably, an
inquiry into justice.2  For them, constitution-talk is justice-talk.
Should we follow their lead?
The question is particularly pressing when we think about the
Constitution outside of courts. Inside the courts, one might
distinguish between constitution-talk and justice-talk on the ground
that the former, but not the latter, results in enforceable legal
judgments. So, inside the courts, we might interpret the Constitution
with justice in mind, but what we do is produce legally enforceable
judgments. Outside the courts, however, it might seem that all we do
is interpret and talk. It is not immediately obvious that cloaking
justice-talk as constitution-talk outside the courts has much rhetorical
force.3 As I will argue, the fact that invoking the Constitution outside
the courts, in the course of discussing justice, does have some
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetowvn University Law
Center.
1. Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and
Constitutional Justice, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1611 (1997); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in
Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L Rev.
410 (1993).
2. Clearly much of the Constitution does not deal with establishing justice, but
rather an operating government that has the capacity to establish justice. Professors
Sager, Eisgruber and I do not contend that constitutional provisions creating an
operating government should be interpreted directly with reference to justice.
Presumably though, one would prefer an interpretation of such provisions that made
it more likely that the government, once up and running, would establish justice. I
have referred to such provisions as the "thick" Constitution to distinguish them from
the "thin" Constitution that Professors Sager, Eisgruber, and I are concerned with in
this discussion. The thin Constitution embodies the principles of the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution's Preamble, which is the part of the Constitution
concerned most directly with accomplishing justice. Mark Tushnet, Taking the
Constitution Away from the Courts 9-13 (1999).
3. See generally Mark Tushnet, What Is Constitutional About Progressive
Constitutionalism?, 4 Widener L. Symp. J. 19 (1999).
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rhetorical force helps to provide a clue to the distinction between
constitution-talk and justice-talk.
Consider the following example: one member of Congress asserts
that justice requires public authorities to assume some responsibility
for paying the costs of essential prescription drugs for the elderly and
the poor. Another member of Congress contends that the
Constitution-say, the equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause-requires public authorities to assume that
responsibility. Has the second member said anything different from
the first? Although I confess my doubts, which might seem to suggest
that I agree with Professors Sager and Eisgruber on the justice-
seeking Constitution, I have, in fact, substantial reservations.
One speaker, invoking justice, may draw on a different set of
resources from another speaker, invoking the Constitution. For
example, the justice-speaker may refer to universal norms of fairness,
or religious traditions regarding responsibility for others, or the
rightness, in consequentialist terms, of providing adequate medical
care. The Constitution-speaker, more attuned to a legal tradition,
may refer to the intent of the Constitution's drafters, the
Constitution's reference in the Preamble to securing justice, and
scattered Supreme Court cases. The constitutional tradition is
broader than that and should be understood to include such doctrines
as President Franklin D. Roosevelt's assertion that our Constitution
should be interpreted to guarantee a "right... to adequate medical
care."4
Is anything gained or lost by treating the two speeches essentially
the same? I take it that the gain seen by proponents of a justice-
seeking Constitution is the translation of legalistic concepts into a
broader, justice-oriented framework, within which can be found
thicker concepts of justice than can be found in more legalistic
sources. There are, however, concomitant losses that deserve to be
noted.
Let us assume that the Constitution-speaker is a lawyer. Can such a
Constitution-speaker contribute anything distinctive to political
discourse, and if so, is the distinctive contribution lost when
constitution-talk is treated as equivalent to justice-talk? Lawyers have
some specialized knowledge and some distinctive skills. These skills
arise primarily in connection with interpreting texts, particularly in
exposing and taking advantage of the ambiguities we believe are
inevitable in any complex text, and, relatedly, in designing institutions
in ways that are sensitive to interactions among their components.'
4. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 171-72 (quoting President Roosevelt and grounding
his speech in a constitutional tradition).
5. An example of the latter capacity, which I admire, is presented in Boris
Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations (1973), which examines a large number of
the technical problems that a reparations scheme would have to work out.
[Vol. 692000
HeinOnline -- 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2000 2000-2001
2001] CONSTITUTION-TALK AND JUSTICE-TALK
Lawyers, however, generally have little to say that is particularly
insightful about justice, especially if defining justice requires attention
to deep normative issues in detailed institutional settings.' Certainly
the legal academic literature that purports to deal directly with justice
is largely simplistic and derivative.7 Anyone who wants to think
deeply about justice would do much better reading political
philosophers than legal academics.8
The shortcomings of lawyers do not, however, lead me to think that
we can make progress in resolving practical problems of governance,
such as those presented by the prescription drug issue, by talking
about justice as identified with the Constitution.' Rather, I am led to
wonder why anyone should pay more attention to lawyers' invocations
of the Constitution as a source of guidance about justice than to
misters' invocations of the Bible, or political philosophers'
invocations of social contract theory.' While ministers and
philosophers may help us understand why adopting a prescription
drug plan is required by justice, lawyers may help us figure out how to
draft a statute that effectively does so. Lawyers are better equipped
than philosophers to figure out how to draft a statute that makes it
more difficult for ingenious doctors and drug companies to evade the
6. Lawyers, though, can remind political theorists, focused primarily on the
normative issues, of the need to attend at some point to institutional detail.
7. I note in particular the really bad critical commentary on John Rawls
produced by law professors. (I cannot recall my own contribution to such
commentary, and I may have been cautious enough not to write any. but I am sure
that if I did, I would be embarrassed to read it today.) For a description of a
particularly acerbic comment made by someone who should know, and that illustrates
my general point here, see Martha Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise, 111 Harv. L
Rev. 1776, 1779 (1998) (describing the comments a philosophy professor might make
about Richard Posner's criticism of Rawls "were she to receive [it] ... in an
undergraduate paper").
8. This is not to say that particular legal academics, as different as Ronald
Dworkin and Patricia Williams, have not made important contributions to our
understanding of justice. The ratio of original work to derivative or uninteresting
work on justice by legal academics, though, is almost certainly lower than that ratio by
political philosophers.
9. My concern about the failure of law professors to produce interesting work on
justice might seem in tension with another position I hold-that law is not itself a
distinctive enterprise; more specifically, it is generally reducible to politics understood
in a broad sense. Saying that law is politics, however, is different from saying that law
is justice (in a particular context). Practical politics requires no specialized knowledge
or skills, but only the knowledge and skills that anyone develops living in organized
society. Figuring out the best political move in any given situation may be difficult,
but it is something everyone can, and frequently does, do in ordinary life. My sense is
that figuring out what justice requires is much more difficult, and does call upon some
specialized skills, which some lawyers have, but which are developed more intensively
in the course of training political philosophers.
10. Perhaps the answer is simply that this is the way a particular subset of the
population talks about justice, which would be an interesting sociological observation.
if true, but which would not, I think, contribute much to the way people in other parts
of the population should think about the Constitution.
2001
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solutions enacted to address the problem of moral hazard." Lawyers
who spend too much time thinking about justice may sacrifice what
they can distinctively contribute to the policy-making process."
Undoubtedly, lawyers, as intelligent people, could get up to speed
on the philosophical questions. We ought to be sensitive, however, to
matters of comparative advantage. Time is limited, and I know that I
personally find it incredibly difficult even to keep up with legal
developments relevant to my areas of expertise. Trying to assimilate
what scholars who spend their time thinking systematically aboutjustice have said (and continue to say) would certainly reduce the time
I have available to keep up with legal developments. Considerations
of comparative advantage suggest that attempting to stay abreast of
political philosophy would be a misallocation of resources.
So far I have focused on the differences between what might be
called the technical aspects of constitution-talk and justice-talk. There
is, in addition, a substantive difference between justice-talk and
constitution-talk. Justice-talk is generally universal, while
constitution-talk is nation-specific.13  The latter proposition is
straightforward. While the Constitution may refer to general concepts
of justice, such as equality, it is ultimately the Constitution of only the
United States. 4 Although the Constitution's reference to equality
surely has implications for the United States government's treatment
11. "Moral hazard" refers to the response expected from rational decision-makers
who are insured against the costs associated with some course of action; when
protected against the associated costs, a rational decision-maker will increase the
amount of that action. In the present context, the moral hazard is that patients will
ask doctors to prescribe more drugs than the doctors otherwise would, because the
patients do not have to pay the full cost of the drugs, and doctors will accede to the
request because the doctors bear no costs from over-prescribing.
12. I offer the following in a quite speculative vein: the past generation of legal
scholarship has seen (a) progressive scholarship dominated by research in the justice-
seeking tradition, (b) conservative scholarship dominated by research in a formalist
and legalistic tradition, and (c) an increasing hold of conservative scholarship in
academic and public debates. Perhaps the last phenomenon derives from the first
two. That is, progressive lawyers, thinking that law and justice are indistinguishable,
may have abandoned the field of law to conservatives. They have criticized
conservative legal scholarship for being formalist and legalistic, rather than providing
reasons that the conservatives' arguments are defective qua legal arguments. Except
for the assertions by progressives that law is indistinguishable from justice,
conservatives have been left to hold the ground of law unchallenged.
13. Subject to a qualification discussed below.
14. For explicit references to the nation-specificity of the United States
Constitution, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) ("We emphasize
that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the
contention.., that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant."
(emphasis in original)); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) ("Justice
Breyer's dissent would have us consider the benefits that other countries, and the
European Union, believe they have derived from federal systems that are different
from ours. We think such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of
interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of
writing one.").
2002 [Vol. 69
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of people beyond this nation's borders,15 the Constitution remains tied
to the particular people and history of the United States.
Constitution-talk, therefore, is about what "We the People of the
United States" ought to do. Of course, what "We the People of the
United States" ought to do may well have some connection to
advancing justice, as the Constitution's Preamble asserts. 6 In this
way, constitution-talk may be contingently connected to justice-talk, a
point to which I will return.
Justice-talk, in contrast, is about what ought to be done by any
person or group of people in a particular situation. This is most
obvious when justice-talk turns to identifying universal human rights,
or rights that attach to people by virtue of their personhood. But it
occurs as well when justice-talk deals with the rights and duties of
people in specific positions, such as parents and children, or citizens of
relatively wealthy nations. I cannot imagine a serious political
philosopher writing about the justice-derived rights and duties of the
American people as such. The American people, from a
philosopher's point of view, are simply an aggregation of individuals
who happen-by chance-to be located within the philosophically
arbitrary territorial boundaries of the United States. Of course, those
people, or at least some of them, might have some justice-relevant
characteristics, such as relatively high wealth. In that event, what is
interesting to the political philosopher is their relatively high wealth,
not their location within United States borders. 11
So, it seems to me, justice-talk is universal and constitution-talk,
even constitution-talk invoking justice-related constitutional terms, is
parochial. Although the term parochial tends to have pejorative
connotations, perhaps those connotations should be ignored. I have a
relatively narrow point and a more general point to make on this
issue. The narrow point is that constitution-talk is parochial
compared to justice-talk's universalism because constitution-talk, as a
subset of law-talk, necessarily emphasizes the degree to which
circumstances alter cases. As lawyers, we are trained to appreciate
this in two ways. Suppose we are given one case and a legal rule that
governs it, then are presented with a second case, and are asked
whether the same legal rule should apply. A lawyer's instinct is to
look for differences between the cases that are relevant to the reasons
15. For a comprehensive discussion of the extraterritorial implications of the
United States Constitution, see Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution:
Immigrants, Borders, and Fundamental Law (1996).
16. We should also acknowledge the possibility that the Constitution is, at least in
some dimensions, unjust in ways that interpretation cannot eliminate. See Robin L
West, Constitutional Scepticism, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 765, 774 (1992) (urging that political
progressives be "sceptical about the Constitution's value").
17. I think it significant, for example, that John Rawls has recently written of the
law of peoples, describing the subjects of his concern as aggregations of people who
satisfy certain general criteria. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: with, The Idea of
Public Reason Revisited 23-25 (1999) (describing the "basic features of peoples").
2003
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for the rule's adoption. Lawyers' professional training makes us
skeptical about the propriety of abstracting rules too far from the
circumstances under which they arose. That professional skepticism is
a kind of parochialism: legal rules, like nations, have a more limited
domain than universal principles of justice. Furthermore, given two
cases and a single rule, we are frequently tempted to reformulate the
rule so that "it" provides correct outcomes in both cases. This
temptation again channels us towards narrowly framed rules and away
from broadly stated universal principles.
To make my more general point, I return for a moment to political
philosophy. Political philosophers have had notorious difficulties in
providing satisfactory justification for special obligations, such as the
ones I have to my wife and children, not because I am a member of
the classes spouse and parent, but because they are simply my wife and
children.'" The literature is full of labored efforts to defend special
obligations by somehow invoking the universalist terms of general
political philosophy, which, as Bernard Williams pointedly wrote,
produces "one thought too many."19 It is a thought too many because
parochial or special relationships are sources of value in themselves
and are not examples of more general phenomena. Again, my
relationship to my wife and children is a source of value to me because
I am their husband and father, not because the relationship falls within
the class of spousal and parental relationships. Moreover, I believe
that special relationships are sources of value in ways that have some
connection to advancing justice outside such relationships."
Constitution-talk, precisely because it is inherently parochial, avoids
the difficulty of forcing special relationships into general categories.
When we engage in constitution-talk, we are talking with each other
as co-citizens or co-members of the United States; the uniqueness of
our relation is inherent in the use of constitution-talk. At this point, it
seems to me, two questions arise. First, is co-membership in a nation
like the United States the right sort of special relationship that can
properly stand apart from "mere" membership in the world
community or the human species?"' Second, even if co-membership in
some nation is the right sort of special relationship, is the United
States the right kind of nation?
18. The philosophical literature deals with this problem by asking whether
obligations of justice can be agent-relative. Including citations to that literature
would be misleading to the extent that it might suggest, not that I know of its
existence, but that I understand it.
19. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, at 18 (1981).
20. The general thought, which would need far more defense than I am competent
to provide, is that deracinated cosmopolitans cannot have commitments to anyone,
even to others considered simply as members of the human species.
21. In contrasting the membership in the United States to membership in the
human species, I do not mean to foreclose consideration of obligations we might have
as humans to non-humans.
2004 [Vol. 69
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The first question arises from the thought that, for many people,
relations with co-members of the nation are far weaker than relations
with non-members. Many readers of this essay, for example, probably
have closer normative and moral ties to members of the transatlantic
elite than with most residents of Iowa.' Similarly, some may have
closer normative and moral ties to members of the Catholic church in
Africa and India than they do to evangelical Protestants in South
Carolina. If co-membership in the United States is not the right sort
of special relationship that can stand apart from membership in the
world community, then constitution-talk would be different from
justice-talk, and may not contribute to advancing justice. Thus,
although co-membership in some nations may provide justice-related
value to some people, membership in a nation as large and diverse as
the United States may not.'
Against this background, I would contend that constitution-talk
may matter because the Constitution constitutes the American
people. As I have mentioned earlier, the provisions of the thick
Constitution have little to do, directly, with establishing justice (or the
other goals set out in the Preamble), whereas those of the thin
Constitution do.24 One notable point about the thick and the thin
Constitution is that both provide opportunities for Americans to
engage in discussions about an object held in common. To use an
example that only law professors could find interesting, people from
New York, Texas, and Wyoming can come together in a discussion of
whether Texas' members of the Electoral College could cast their
votes for both George W. Bush and Richard Cheney. This and similar
discussions matter because they deal with the way we all are going to
find ourselves governed. The Constitution, then, is one thing-
perhaps the only thing-around which everyone in the United States
can gather. It may be a large part of what makes us Americans rather
than cosmopolitans or (merely) Catholics or Jews or Protestants.
Beyond that, there are the thin Constitution's commitments to
justice. Those commitments do not prescribe outcomes-precisely
because they are thin. Constitution-talk about the thin Constitution
may differ from justice-talk in this regard because justice-talk aims at
identifying the correct principles of justice. Constitution-talk about
the thin Constitution does not have that aim, although each
participant in the conversation may hope that the outcome will be the
choice of the correct principles. Rather, the aim of people engaged in
constitution-talk about the thin Constitution is the conversation itself.
If the United States is not the right kind of community, constitution-
22. I refer to Iowa specifically because most of my spouse's family continues to
live there.
23. Sometimes I think of this as the "what's he to Hecuba" problem. See William
Shakespeare, Hamlet act 2, sc. 2 ("What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba, That he
should weep for her?").
24. See supra note 2.
2005
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talk would be different from justice-talk, and would not contribute to
advancing justice. This thin Constitution strives not to achieve
particular principles of justice but to advance the enterprise of
establishing justice.2 Justice-talk can thus enter into constitution-talk,
but the latter remains distinctive because it is about the commitments
of a particular people, not about the requirements of some universal
principles of justice.
I conclude that constitution-talk differs from justice-talk because
the latter is necessarily connected to justice itself, while the former is
only contingently connected to justice. It is an accident, but a happy
one, that the United States Constitution contributes to constituting a
people among whose commitments is the establishment of justice.
25. Politics will determine the actual outcomes of conversations about the thin
Constitution's principles, in a world where people reasonably disagree about the
implications of those principles for particular problems.
2006 [Vol. 69
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